Starting from June 2026, the European Union enters a new phase of its migration policy. After years of negotiations, the European Pact on Migration and Asylum becomes fully applicable. This is not a single law, but a set of texts that reorganize the way member states register migrants, examine asylum applications, control borders, allocate responsibilities, and execute return decisions. The stated objective is twofold: to make the system faster and more predictable, while preventing each member state from applying its own rules in isolation. Until now, Europe already had a common framework, notably with the Dublin Regulation, the Schengen area, Frontex, and Eurodac. But in practice, procedures remained very different depending on the country, delays were long, multiple applications existed, and deportations were rarely executed. The new mechanism therefore seeks to harmonize practices, accelerate decisions, and strengthen cooperation between national administrations.
The first change concerns identification. With the Eurodac regulation 2024/1358, the European Union is strengthening its biometric database. Fingerprints, facial images, and identity data of asylum seekers, people intercepted at external borders, or people in an irregular stay will be more centralized. In concrete terms, when a person arrives in Greece, Italy, Spain, or elsewhere, their data can be registered more quickly and consulted by the authorities of other member states. The goal is to avoid multiple asylum applications under different identities and to better track secondary movements within the Union.
The second change concerns screening at entry. Regulation 2024/1356 introduces a screening procedure at external borders. A person who arrives irregularly in the European Union may be subject to a rapid verification: identity, health, safety, potential vulnerability, biometric data, and referral to the appropriate procedure. The idea is to distinguish profiles more quickly: those who can apply for asylum, those who fall under an accelerated procedure, those who must be directed toward a return procedure, and those who present a security risk.
The third change relates to asylum procedures. Regulation 2024/1348 creates a common procedure for international protection. This means that member states will have to apply rules that are closer to one another to examine an asylum application. Certain applications could be processed more quickly, notably when the applicant comes from a country considered safe, when they have provided false information, when they represent a security risk, or when their application appears manifestly unfounded. This does not abolish the right to asylum, but it reduces the procedural room for maneuver that sometimes allowed weak files to last for several months or several years.
The fourth change concerns the border procedure. Regulation 2024/1349 establishes a border return procedure. In certain cases, when an asylum application is rejected within the framework of a border procedure, the return can be organized without the person fully entering European territory. In practice, this means that centers located near external borders could become locations for rapid examination of files and, in case of refusal, locations for return preparation. This is one of the most sensitive aspects of the reform, as it raises questions about reception conditions, access to a lawyer, appeals, and the protection of vulnerable people.
The fifth change concerns responsibility between member states. Regulation 2024/1351 replaces the old Dublin system with a new regulation on asylum and migration management. The principle remains close: the first country of entry or the responsible country must generally process the application. But the system is supplemented by a solidarity mechanism. Member states under high migratory pressure will be able to request European assistance. This solidarity could take several forms: relocation of asylum seekers, financial contribution, operational support, or administrative assistance. In other words, a country can either welcome a portion of the people or contribute otherwise to the common effort.
The sixth change concerns deportations. This is probably the most politically important component. The new European regulation on returns aims to make removal decisions more effective. Until now, a decision taken in one member state was not always followed by effect in another. The new system wants to create a European logic: a return decision taken by one state will have to be more widely recognized by the others. The objective is to prevent a person rejected in one country from simply moving to another country to start a new procedure all over again.
The regulation on returns also provides for the possibility of a European return order. In concrete terms, when a person no longer has the right to stay, the return decision could be integrated into a common system, visible and enforceable on a European scale. This would allow Belgian, French, German, or Dutch authorities to work on the basis of shared information. Harmonization does not mean that Brussels will directly deport in place of the states, but that national decisions will fit more into a common European framework.
Another important element: entry bans could be longer and better coordinated. When a person is deported, they can be banned from returning to the Schengen area for a certain period. The new framework wants to strengthen this dimension to avoid rapid returns after removal. In certain serious cases, notably regarding security, the bans could be particularly long. The regulation also provides for more coercive measures in case of non-cooperation. A person who refuses to provide their documents, who conceals their identity, who does not show up for summons, or who tries to evade the procedure could be subject to stronger restrictions. This can include detention, residence obligation, handing over of documents, regular checks, or other administrative measures. The goal is to reduce the number of people who disappear before the execution of the return decision. The question of detention is central. Member states will be able to detain certain people when the risk of absconding is established, when the person refuses to cooperate, or when they represent a threat. This detention is not presented as automatic, but as a tool to guarantee the execution of the return. It is also one of the points most criticized by human rights organizations, which fear a normalization of administrative confinement, including for families or vulnerable people.
One of the most novel points is the possibility of creating “return hubs” in third countries. This means that a member state could conclude an agreement with a non-European country to transfer people there who no longer have the right to remain in the European Union. These centers could serve either as a final destination or as a place of transit before a return to the country of origin. Legally, these agreements will have to respect international law, notably the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits sending a person back to a country where they risk torture, persecution, or inhumane treatment.
This idea of return hubs is inspired in part by debates already held in the United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, or Germany. But we must be precise: it is not yet a generalized and operational system throughout Europe. It creates a European legal basis allowing such agreements, but each agreement will have to be negotiated with a third country, funded, monitored, and legally secured. The transition from principle to practice will therefore be complex.
The Italian case with Albania is the most advanced. Italy has concluded an agreement with Albania to process certain asylum applications in centers located on Albanian territory, but under Italian responsibility. The project targets migrants intercepted at sea, before their actual arrival in Italy. The idea is to process applications quickly outside of Italian territory, then organize either reception in Italy in case of acceptance, or return in case of refusal. However, this model has encountered numerous judicial roadblocks. Italian courts have challenged certain decisions, notably on the concept of a safe country. The Court of Justice of the European Union has been seized, and the debate remains highly regulated legally.
The Rwandan model, for its part, is different. The United Kingdom wanted to send certain asylum seekers who arrived irregularly to Rwanda, so that their application could be processed there and they could potentially stay there. But this British project was deemed problematic by British justice, notably due to insufficient guarantees against refoulement. The Labour government that came to power in 2024 subsequently abandoned this mechanism. Rwanda is therefore not today a generalized operational European model. It remains a political reference in the debate, but its concrete application failed in the United Kingdom.
Albania and Rwanda must therefore not be confused. In the Albanian case, it is an agreement between a member state of the European Union and a non-EU European country, with Italian management of the procedures. In the Rwandan case, it was a transfer to an African country considered a third country of care, outside the European framework. The first model is legally still under discussion; the second was abandoned by the United Kingdom.
Will these new rules solve the immigration problem? The answer must be nuanced. They can improve the administrative management of flows, reduce procedural abuses, accelerate certain decisions, and make deportations more credible. They can also deter certain economic migrants from filing an unfounded asylum application if delays become shorter and if the risk of return becomes more real. But they will not eliminate the root causes of migration: poverty, conflicts, political instability, climate change, criminal networks, demographic pressure, and the European demand for labor.
The deterrent effect will depend above all on the actual execution of returns. Today, the major problem is not only making a deportation decision, but executing it. Many countries of origin refuse or delay the issuance of consular travel documents. Some people do not have documents. Others disappear before their removal. Judicial appeals can prolong procedures. Without solid cooperation with countries of origin, even stricter European legislation will remain partially ineffective.
This is why European migration policy is moving more and more toward diplomacy. The European Union seeks to link visas, development aid, trade agreements, police cooperation, and readmission of nationals. Clearly, a third country that cooperates in the return of its nationals could benefit from advantages; a country that refuses could face visa restrictions or a reduction in certain cooperations. Migration thus becomes a central instrument of the European Union’s external relations.
These rules can also modify migratory routes. If controls strengthen in the Central Mediterranean, flows can shift toward the Atlantic, the Balkans, or other routes. Migratory history shows that closing a route does not always stop departures; it can simply displace the crossings, increase the costs paid to smugglers, and make the journeys more dangerous. Effectiveness will therefore depend on the European capacity to combine control, external cooperation, and legal pathways for immigration. On identity cards and residence permits, things must also be clarified. The European Union is not creating a single identity card for all foreigners. On the other hand, it is strengthening the standardization of data, the use of biometrics, and the interconnection of systems. National residence cards will continue to exist, but they will fit into a more integrated European environment. What changes is not necessarily the physical document presented at the counter; it is the capacity of European administrations to verify more quickly the identity, the background, and the administrative situation of a person.
In concrete terms, a person who arrives irregularly in the European Union will first be identified, registered, and directed. If they apply for asylum, their file will be examined according to a normal or accelerated procedure. If they come from a country considered safe or if their application appears manifestly unfounded, it can be processed more quickly. If the application is rejected, a return decision can be taken. This decision must be more easily recognized throughout the Union. In case of non-cooperation or risk of absconding, restrictive measures can be imposed. If an agreement exists with a third country, a transfer to a return hub could become possible, subject to legal guarantees.
The reform therefore does not transform the European Union into a federal state of immigration. Member states retain a central role: they process files, take decisions, organize returns, and negotiate certain agreements. But the framework becomes much more European. Identification, databases, procedures, deadlines, solidarity, and returns will be more harmonized.
The main challenge will be implementation. A reform can be ambitious on paper, but its effectiveness will depend on human resources, reception spaces, adapted centers, magistrates, interpreters, lawyers, police officers, Frontex, agreements with third countries, and respect for fundamental rights. If states do not have the necessary resources, delays risk remaining long. If countries of origin do not cooperate, returns will remain difficult. If legal guarantees are insufficient, courts will block certain measures.
In reality, these new laws are not going to make immigration to Europe disappear. Instead, they will change the way Europe treats it. The objective is not only to reduce arrivals, but to regain administrative and political control of a system considered too slow, too fragmented, and too lacking in credibility. Success will depend on a delicate balance: firmness in the execution of rules, respect for the right to asylum, cooperation with third countries, and the capacity to offer legal pathways for Europe’s real economic needs.
The great novelty of 2026 is therefore the entry into an integrated European migratory logic. Europe is no longer just coordinating national policies; it is progressively building a common system of identification, procedure, responsibility, solidarity, and return. This is the most important reform since the migratory crisis of 2015. But it will only be effective if it passes the test of reality: the courts, the administrations, the countries of origin, the partner countries, and the migratory flows themselves.