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Summary: A Russian vessel officially labelled as a “research ship” has spent months moving quietly around Europe’s most sensitive undersea cables, prompting renewed concern among EU security officials about sabotage, espionage, and the resilience of Europe’s digital and energy infrastructure. The Financial Times and specialised defence monitors report that the ship, Yantar, has capabilities far beyond oceanographic research, including deep-sea surveillance and potential cable disruption—adding urgency to Europe’s efforts to protect infrastructure that carries internet, military signals, and electricity across the continent.
Russia’s underwater shadow
For months, the Russian vessel Yantar has been operating around some of Europe’s most strategic undersea cables, according to reporting originally highlighted by the technology analysis published on 22 November and subsequent summaries by the Financial Times. Officially described by Moscow as a “research vessel”, the 108-metre ship has sailed routes that closely shadow Europe’s essential communications and power infrastructure.
Yantar’s latest movements included passing through the Baltic Sea, circling Denmark and Norway, and then lingering near high-value cables off the coasts of the United Kingdom and Ireland. After this tour, it slipped away from public tracking while still broadcasting the profile of a civilian vessel.
Despite Russia’s public classification, Yantar entered service with the Russian Navy in 2012 and deploys deep-sea submersibles capable of reaching 6,000 metres. These systems, according to assessments published by the U.S. Navy, can locate, tap, or cut seabed cables. The same capability—if misused—could disrupt electricity supply, internet connectivity, and even NATO military communications.
Undersea cables carry more than 95% of global data traffic. Any vulnerability therefore becomes systemic: a single act of sabotage could affect millions of people, companies, and governments across the European Union.
A long record of sensitive missions
Yantar’s current behaviour fits a well-established pattern. Over the past decade it has approached strategic cable systems in multiple regions, including:
- U.S. cables near Guantánamo Bay in 2015,
- Norwegian and Greenlandic waters shortly afterwards,
- telecommunications routes between Israel and Cyprus in 2017,
- Brazilian coastal infrastructure in 2020,
- Norwegian military vessels in 2023,
- and, in 2024, major tech-company data cables in the Irish Sea.
In some instances, naval forces attempted to communicate with the vessel and received no response. Analysts say this suggests pre-planned intelligence-gathering operations rather than scientific missions.
Growing concerns within the EU
European officials have repeatedly stressed that the EU must treat undersea infrastructure as part of its core security architecture. Recent incidents—such as the Nord Stream pipeline explosions and the subsea cable damage between Estonia and Finland—have already increased scrutiny across EU institutions, including in debates over resilience and hybrid threats.
The latest reports on Yantar add urgency. They come as European security agencies warn that covert interference with cables is increasingly plausible and potentially devastating.
An analysis by The European Times on seabed security challenges earlier this year underscored that Europe’s digital arteries remain vulnerable without stronger monitoring and cooperation between Member States.
A strategic warning
Experts say Russia’s parallel investments in its own sovereign digital networks could be a strategic signal: reducing its dependency on global systems might provide more room for disruptive operations elsewhere.
Whether Yantar has already planted surveillance devices—or something more dangerous—remains unknown. Its opaque operations, however, underline a wider lesson: in the era of hybrid tactics, threats do not always appear in the sky or on land. Some travel quietly below the surface.
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