This deal is getting worse all the time

When Darth Vader tells Lando Calrissian in The Empire Strikes Back, “I am altering the deal, pray I don’t alter it any further,” it captures a particular kind of asymmetric bargaining in which one side dictates terms, then revises them at will. Lando’s resigned reply, “This deal is getting worse all the time”, captures a sentiment Europeans may increasingly find themselves echoing in relation to the Turnberry accord.  

What was initially presented as a stabilising framework for EU–US trade relations now appears increasingly fragile and subject to continual revision. European policymakers justified the painful concessions on the grounds that the agreement would at least provide the predictability businesses need. Yet predictability is precisely what is lacking, as the deal has degraded incrementally, shaped less by negotiated commitments than by shifting political impulses in Washington. 

The latest episode underscores this dynamic. Following German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s criticism of the American war in Iran, President Donald Trump lashed out and threatened tariffs of up to 25% on European automobiles. Such a move would directly contravene the Turnberry deal, which capped auto tariffs at 15% – a ceiling that had been touted by the European Commission as one of the agreement’s central achievements, particularly in shielding the bloc’s vital automotive sector. 

This is not an isolated deviation. Since its signing, the agreement has been repeatedly violated by the United States. Washington’s decision to reclassify hundreds of industrial goods as steel derivatives subject to 50% tariffs just weeks after Turnberry demonstrated that the Trump administration was not acting in good faith. Subsequent brinkmanship over Greenland further eroded trust. Now, the renewed threat against the auto sector reinforces a broader pattern: commitments are provisional, and escalation is never off the table. 

For European businesses, this creates a deeply unstable environment. Trade deals are meant to reduce uncertainty, yet the persistent threat of tariff increases – even when not enacted – undermines confidence to invest and plan. A deal that can be unilaterally “altered” at any moment ceases to serve its core purpose. 

The question, then, is how Europe should respond. 

At the height of Trump’s initial tariff offensive, Europe could have taken advantage of the pressure already being exerted on the United States by China’s restrictions on rare earth exports, potentially placing Washington in a strategic bind. Such a “pincer” dynamic could have imposed sufficient economic pressure to force a recalibration. That moment, however, has largely passed. The conditions for such leverage are no longer readily available and the geopolitical landscape has shifted. 

More fundamentally, Europe’s capacity to inflict reciprocal economic pain remains limited. While the EU possesses tools of leverage, they are neither as concentrated nor as politically deployable as those available to China. Use of European chokepoints carry significant political and economic costs, likely proving unacceptable to several member states and key industrial actors. This asymmetry constrains Europe’s options and complicates calls for a more confrontational approach. 

Yet acquiescence carries its own risks. The Turnberry framework, as it currently operates, risks institutionalising a form of subordination in transatlantic trade relations. Rather than a partnership of equals, the dynamic increasingly resembles one in which Europe absorbs pressure and adjusts accordingly. 

There are, however, elements on which Europe can build. The Greenland episode, while destabilising, revealed a capacity for unity among member states when confronted with coercion. That cohesion, tentative though it may be, offers a foundation for a more credible collective stance. The challenge lies in sustaining and operationalising it, particularly as Washington continues to test the limits of European tolerance. 

Alas, there appears to be little political appetite among several member states and key groups in the European Parliament, most notably within the EPP, to reopen negotiations or fundamentally revisit the Turnberry deal. Even in the wake of the major blow Trump has suffered with the IEEPA Supreme Court ruling, which presented what might have been a perfect opportunity for a more assertive European response, the agreement is in practice unlikely to be undone. 

More fundamentally, Europe must adapt to a counterpart whose approach to economic statecraft remains inherently mercurial and only loosely constrained by agreed rules. In such a context, the priority must be to preserve negotiated outcomes by ensuring they cannot be unilaterally redefined in practice. This requires greater institutional flexibility on the European side – ensuring that concessions remain conditional and reversible, and that there are credible pathways to respond when commitments are disregarded. 

Ultimately, Europe faces a narrow path between escalation and passivity. It lacks the leverage to coerce a reversal in US policy outright, yet it cannot afford to normalise a pattern of continuous concession. 

Ian Hernandez is an analyst at the European Policy Centre. His work focuses on transatlantic relations and economic security.