Eleven Years of War in Yemen: The Paradox of a Saudi Arabia Unable to Secure Peace on Its Own Borders
Some wars eventually produce consequences far greater than the ambitions of those who launched them. The war in Yemen is one of the clearest examples. When Saudi Arabia led a military coalition into Yemen in March 2015, its leaders sought to restore the internationally recognized Yemeni government, push back the Houthi movement, and prevent an Iran-aligned armed force from establishing a permanent foothold along the kingdom’s southern border. More than eleven years later, the contrast between those ambitions and the political reality is striking. Despite billions of dollars in military expenditure, advanced Western fighter aircraft, strategic cooperation with the United States, and overwhelming technological advantages, Riyadh has not achieved the political settlement it originally sought. The Houthis have not disappeared. They remain firmly entrenched across substantial parts of northern Yemen, retain significant military capabilities, and have demonstrated their ability to threaten Saudi interests and maritime security in the Red Sea. This does not mean that Saudi Arabia has lost all leverage or that its adversaries have secured a definitive victory. It does, however, expose a fundamental limitation of military power: winning battles, conducting airstrikes, and acquiring sophisticated weapons cannot, by themselves, transform a deeply divided country into a stable political order. For Mohammed bin Salman, whose political vision rests on economic modernization and Saudi Arabia’s emergence as a major international power, Yemen has become a persistent contradiction. The kingdom seeks to embody the future while remaining confronted by a conflict rooted in strategic decisions made more than a decade ago.
From Military Intervention to Negotiations: How Riyadh Changed Its Strategy Without Resolving the Conflict
The evolution of Saudi policy in Yemen tells the story of an intervention launched with ambitious objectives but confronted by a far more complicated reality. During the early years of the conflict, Riyadh relied heavily on military pressure and air operations, believing that weakening the Houthis would eventually allow a friendly central government to regain authority. Instead, the war became increasingly entrenched, front lines hardened in several areas, Yemeni institutions fragmented, and the humanitarian consequences reached devastating proportions. Saudi Arabia gradually recognized that military operations alone could not guarantee the security of its southern border. The United Nations-brokered truce in 2022 opened the possibility of a different approach. Although the agreement formally expired, it contributed to a substantial reduction in direct hostilities and created space for further diplomatic contacts. The Saudi-Iranian rapprochement announced in March 2023, facilitated by China, reflected the same search for regional de-escalation. Riyadh’s priorities became more pragmatic: reducing security risks, protecting national infrastructure, and preventing Yemen from continuing to consume considerable political and military resources. Yet this strategic adjustment encountered a fundamental obstacle. The Houthis are not simply an external force that can be pushed back across a border. They are a political and military movement deeply rooted in parts of Yemeni territory. Negotiating with them requires acknowledging their influence, while fighting them indefinitely offers no guarantee of eliminating that influence. This is the central dilemma facing Saudi Arabia: how to disengage from a confrontation without abandoning the security objectives that originally justified intervention.
The Houthis and Saudi Military Power: Why Superior Weapons Have Failed to Deliver a Decisive Political Outcome
The resilience of the Houthis is among the most revealing military and political developments of the Yemen conflict. On paper, the imbalance in resources is enormous. On one side stands an oil-rich monarchy equipped with modern combat aircraft, sophisticated defense systems, and close relationships with major Western arms manufacturers. On the other stands an armed movement that emerged from the mountainous regions of northern Yemen, historically lacking the financial and technological resources available to a state such as Saudi Arabia. Yet this material imbalance has not produced the political outcome Riyadh expected. The Houthis have exploited their knowledge of the terrain, developed military structures adapted to prolonged conflict, maintained local networks, and expanded their use of asymmetric capabilities, including missiles and drones. Iranian support has played an important role in strengthening aspects of their military capacity, but the movement cannot be understood solely as an instrument of Tehran. It pursues its own political, territorial, and institutional ambitions. This combination makes the challenge facing Riyadh particularly difficult. A conventional military can destroy positions, disrupt supply networks, and temporarily degrade operational capabilities. It cannot, through force alone, eliminate the political causes of a conflict or establish a legitimate replacement authority accepted by the population. Yemen therefore illustrates a recurring limitation of military superiority: dominance in the air and access to advanced technology do not automatically translate into lasting territorial control or political legitimacy. The distinction between military strength and strategic achievement lies at the heart of Saudi Arabia’s prolonged difficulties.
Mohammed bin Salman and Vision 2030: How the Yemen War Complicates Saudi Arabia’s Economic Transformation
To understand the wider implications of this strategic deadlock, it is necessary to look beyond Yemen and consider what the conflict means for Saudi Arabia’s economic future. Mohammed bin Salman has embarked on an ambitious transformation intended to fundamentally reshape the kingdom’s development model. Through Vision 2030, Riyadh aims to reduce dependence on oil revenues, develop new industries, attract foreign investment, expand tourism, and position Saudi Arabia as a major destination for international businesses, capital, and global events. This strategy depends on an essential promise: that the kingdom can offer the stability, security, and predictability required by investors. Yet the proximity of a prolonged conflict presents a structural challenge to that ambition. Threats against energy facilities, risks to aviation, and tensions around the Red Sea demonstrate that Saudi security cannot be guaranteed by financial resources alone. As Saudi Arabia expands its infrastructure and integrates more deeply into the global economy, it also increases the number of strategic assets requiring protection. A major tourism development, logistics hub, or international financial center depends not only on the capital invested in its construction but also on sustained confidence in the surrounding security environment. This does not mean Vision 2030 is destined to fail. Saudi Arabia retains substantial financial resources and significant opportunities for economic development. Nevertheless, Yemen exposes a fundamental contradiction in the kingdom’s modernization narrative: an economy aspiring to become a global crossroads cannot treat regional insecurity as a peripheral concern.
Riyadh’s Security Vulnerabilities: The Economic and Strategic Costs of Drones, Missiles, and Asymmetric Warfare
One of the most sensitive aspects of the confrontation is the ability of actors with comparatively limited resources to threaten infrastructure of immense economic and strategic value. Saudi Arabia must protect oil installations, industrial complexes, airports, ports, urban centers, and transport networks spread across a vast territory. Even with advanced defense systems, this presents enormous challenges. Drones and missiles can force authorities to maintain constant vigilance, deploy expensive interception systems, and continuously adapt surveillance and defensive capabilities. The financial imbalance can become particularly burdensome when the cost of intercepting a projectile substantially exceeds the cost of producing or launching it. The consequences extend beyond physical destruction. A credible threat, even when no attack ultimately succeeds, can disrupt aviation, influence insurance premiums, alter investment decisions, and require additional security expenditure. For Saudi leaders, the challenge is therefore not simply to maintain the ability to retaliate but to prevent intermittent threats from undermining the normal functioning of the national economy. It would be inaccurate to suggest that Saudi defensive systems are ineffective; they can intercept incoming threats and reduce damage. However, no defensive architecture can guarantee absolute protection. The strategic problem is clear: a state can possess overwhelming military superiority while remaining exposed to relatively limited attacks capable of generating disproportionate economic and political consequences.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea: Why Yemen Gives the Houthis Influence Far Beyond Their Borders
Yemen’s geographical position helps explain why the conflict has acquired such international importance. Near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, lies one of the principal maritime passages linking Asian trade with European markets through the Suez Canal. This geography transforms developments inside Yemen into a matter of global concern. Attacks against commercial shipping and threats to maritime navigation can force shipping companies to change routes, increase security expenditure, and accept longer delivery times. When the Red Sea becomes too dangerous, some operators divert vessels around Africa through the Cape of Good Hope, with consequences for transport costs and global supply chains. For Riyadh, this situation adds another difficult dimension to the Yemen question. Saudi Arabia seeks to expand its logistics infrastructure and strengthen its position in international trade, yet it must contend with an armed movement capable of disrupting a major maritime corridor. The Houthis consequently possess a source of leverage that extends far beyond their economic resources and territorial base. This does not give them control over regional commerce, but it provides them with strategic relevance that major powers cannot ignore. Security in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait concerns Saudi, Egyptian, European, American, and Asian interests simultaneously. These actors, however, do not necessarily share the same vision for Yemen’s political future. International cooperation to protect freedom of navigation does not automatically imply agreement with every military or political objective pursued by Riyadh.
Iran, the Houthis, and Saudi Arabia: A Regional Rivalry That Diplomacy Has Not Eliminated
Iran remains central to Saudi strategic calculations, but reducing the Yemen war to a confrontation between Riyadh and Tehran would overlook the country’s internal political realities. Iranian support has contributed to the development of Houthi military capabilities, while the broader rivalry between the two regional powers has shaped the conflict’s international dimensions. Nevertheless, the Houthis possess their own leadership structures, political ambitions, and territorial interests. This relative autonomy helps explain why diplomatic rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran cannot, by itself, bring the war to an end. The normalization agreement announced in 2023 represented an important development, restoring diplomatic relations and creating new opportunities for dialogue. It did not eliminate fundamental disagreements concerning regional security, military alliances, and the influence of non-state armed groups. For Mohammed bin Salman, the challenge is to pursue a less confrontational relationship with Tehran while ensuring that Yemeni territory does not remain a permanent source of threats against Saudi Arabia. Iran, meanwhile, has regional interests that do not necessarily coincide with Saudi priorities. The Houthis may also regard reduced tensions between the two states as insufficient grounds for abandoning their own demands. This overlap of competing interests makes negotiations particularly difficult. It also demonstrates why conflicts shaped by regional rivalries cannot be resolved sustainably without addressing the objectives, autonomy, and political legitimacy of local actors.
The Yemeni Humanitarian Tragedy: Eleven Years of War, Political Fragmentation, and Economic Devastation
Behind Riyadh’s strategic calculations, Houthi ambitions, and regional rivalries stands a population that has endured the devastating consequences of prolonged conflict. Yemen has witnessed the fragmentation of state institutions, the deterioration of essential infrastructure, and the severe weakening of its economy. Hospitals struggle with limited resources, water and electricity networks remain fragile, displacement has transformed the lives of countless families, and food insecurity continues to affect large sections of the population. These realities require an analysis that goes beyond military considerations. Capturing a city, destroying a weapons depot, or reopening a strategic road does not amount to rebuilding a functioning state. Political legitimacy, the distribution of resources, access to public services, and coexistence among Yemen’s different communities remain fundamental questions. Responsibility for civilian suffering must be examined across all parties to the conflict. Indiscriminate attacks, unlawful restrictions, and obstruction of humanitarian assistance cannot be justified by the military objectives of any side. For Saudi Arabia, the persistence of this humanitarian catastrophe also presents a diplomatic challenge. The intervention was initially presented as an operation intended to restore legitimate political authority. Yet the promised stability remains elusive, while accumulated destruction makes national recovery increasingly difficult. Yemen offers a reminder that a country does not become stable simply because an external coalition possesses the capacity to conduct airstrikes or an armed movement succeeds in establishing control over territory.
Mohammed bin Salman’s Strategic Dilemma: Between Demonstrating Strength and Accepting Political Compromise
The political challenge confronting Mohammed bin Salman lies in the difficulty of pursuing several objectives simultaneously without making compromises. Saudi Arabia must protect its territory, preserve its military credibility, support its Yemeni partners, and maintain its international relationships. It must also prevent the confrontation with the Houthis from undermining its economic ambitions. A firm military response may appear necessary to address immediate threats, but it carries the risk of perpetuating cycles of retaliation. Negotiations may reduce tensions, but they require engagement with a movement Riyadh originally sought to weaken. Disengagement may free resources for domestic priorities without guaranteeing that security threats will disappear. It would be speculative to claim certainty about the crown prince’s personal intentions or the precise considerations behind every decision. What is clear, however, is the contradiction between the original ambitions of the intervention and the demands of subsequent diplomacy. In practice, Riyadh has increasingly recognized that a sustainable settlement cannot depend exclusively on military pressure. For a leader seeking to project the image of a powerful, modern kingdom capable of shaping its regional environment, this reality represents a substantial challenge. The credibility of a regional power depends not only on its ability to intervene but also on its capacity to define achievable objectives, contain the costs of confrontation, and construct political arrangements capable of protecting its interests over time.
Washington, Beijing, and the Gulf Monarchies: Powerful Partners but No Guarantee of a Political Settlement
Saudi Arabia is far from isolated internationally. It maintains a strategic relationship with the United States, has expanded its economic engagement with China, and remains central to the diplomatic and commercial balance of the Gulf. Yet these partnerships cannot guarantee a settlement in Yemen. Washington can provide military equipment, intelligence capabilities, and security cooperation, but external assistance alone cannot establish a Yemeni government recognized by all competing factions. Beijing can facilitate dialogue between regional powers, as demonstrated by its role in the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, without necessarily possessing the political leverage required to impose a compromise on every Yemeni actor. The Gulf monarchies themselves have at times supported different political and military forces, particularly in southern Yemen, revealing priorities that do not always align. This diversity of interests makes the situation more complicated than a confrontation between two clearly defined camps. Saudi Arabia can mobilize significant alliances to protect infrastructure, defend diplomatic positions, and support local partners. But reconstructing a viable Yemeni political order requires agreements that cannot simply be dictated from Washington, Beijing, or Riyadh. This is a fundamental limitation of external influence: major powers can shape military balances, facilitate negotiations, and provide resources, but they cannot permanently substitute for the institutions and political compromises of a deeply divided society.
The Record of Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Political Objectives Remain Unfulfilled Despite Overwhelming Military Resources
More than eleven years after the intervention began, its record must be examined against the objectives that originally justified it. In 2015, Riyadh sought to restore the internationally recognized government and contain Houthi expansion. Yet Ansar Allah remains a major military and political actor, Yemeni territory continues to be fragmented, and no comprehensive national settlement has restored uncontested central authority. These developments demonstrate the limitations of the results achieved relative to Saudi Arabia’s original ambitions. They do not mean that Riyadh has lost all influence or that the Houthis can impose their political project across Yemen without resistance. Saudi-backed forces continue to hold important positions, and the military balance remains subject to change. Nevertheless, the prolonged duration of the conflict reveals a fundamental difficulty: the initial military strategy did not produce the desired political order. This observation extends beyond Saudi Arabia. It raises a recurring question concerning foreign military interventions: how can superior military resources be converted into lasting institutions, political legitimacy, and effective security? In Yemen, internal divisions, regional rivalries, and the resilience of armed groups have obstructed that transformation. The experience demonstrates that material power, however considerable, can never replace a deep understanding of local political realities. Riyadh’s challenge is now to identify a security and coexistence arrangement that does not depend on the assumption that military superiority will eventually resolve every contradiction underlying the conflict.
What Comes Next for Yemen and Saudi Arabia? Negotiations, Escalation, and the Future of Middle Eastern Security
The future of the conflict will depend on whether its principal actors can move beyond a logic in which every concession is interpreted as weakness and every military advance is treated as the beginning of a definitive victory. Continued hostilities would prolong civilian suffering and maintain risks to Saudi borders and international shipping. A bilateral de-escalation between Riyadh and the Houthis could improve the kingdom’s immediate security without necessarily resolving Yemen’s internal divisions. A broader political process would need to address power-sharing, the integration of armed forces, institutional governance, resource management, and security guarantees. Each of these issues presents major difficulties because Yemeni actors pursue different objectives and possess unequal levels of influence. For Riyadh, peace primarily means removing military threats to Saudi territory. For the Houthis, it includes recognition of their position within the national political order. For other Yemeni groups, it requires guarantees against political exclusion and excessive concentration of power. For civilians, the immediate priority remains the ability to live without bombardment, forced displacement, and permanent dependence on humanitarian assistance. None of these issues can be resolved through diplomatic declarations alone. They require verifiable commitments, confidence-building mechanisms, and a willingness to compromise that years of warfare have severely weakened. The regional challenge is therefore not simply to identify a military victor but to establish conditions under which renewed fighting ceases to appear to the parties as an acceptable means of resolving political disputes.
Conclusion — Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, and Yemen: When Military Power Collides with Geopolitical Reality
The war in Yemen will remain an important case study in understanding the limits of power in the contemporary Middle East. Saudi Arabia has committed substantial military and financial resources to an intervention whose fundamental political objectives remain unfulfilled. The Houthis have demonstrated a capacity for resistance and adaptation that has enabled them to retain a central position in Yemen’s political and military landscape, while the country continues to suffer the consequences of deep institutional fragmentation. For Mohammed bin Salman, this situation creates a lasting tension between the ambition to present Saudi Arabia as a modern, attractive, and influential state and the necessity of managing persistent instability along its borders. Vision 2030, international partnerships, and Saudi military capabilities remain important instruments of national power, but none can substitute for a political settlement in Yemen. The experience of the past eleven years therefore highlights two realities that are too often confused: possessing the means to wage war and possessing the conditions required to establish peace. Saudi Arabia retains considerable capabilities, but the persistence of the Yemen question demonstrates that regional influence cannot be measured solely through military expenditure, technological sophistication, or investment capacity. It must also be measured through the ability to generate lasting stability, understand local political dynamics, and transform diplomatic compromises into practical security guarantees. It is on this terrain, rather than through demonstrations of military power alone, that the future relationship between Riyadh and Yemen will ultimately be shaped.
(*) Lahcen Isaac Hammouch is a Belgian-Moroccan journalist and writer. The author of several books and opinion articles, he examines societal challenges, governance issues, and the transformations shaping the contemporary world.
